Research note · Training methodology

Teaching P34 to learn markets, not memorize them

How we train a profit-directed model to reason from biased data.

This describes a training method, not a result. It sets out how P34 is trained and why the objective is shaped the way it is. Synthetic environments are labeled as synthetic throughout; they do not prove live-market performance, and nothing here is a promise of profit. What is measured, and what is stated as unknown, lives on Research & evidence.
01 — The objective

Predicting the past is not the job

Most machine-learning systems are trained to answer a relatively simple question:

Given examples from the past, what outcome should I predict next?

For P34, that is not enough.

The markets we care about are partially observed. A business typically knows what happened to the deals it executed, but it does not know what would have happened to the thousands of opportunities it rejected. Its historical data is therefore biased by its own previous decisions.

That creates a difficult problem. A sufficiently powerful model can become very good at reproducing the patterns present in historical data while becoming dangerously wrong about the opportunities it will encounter after deployment.

Our training objective is therefore different. We are trying to teach P34 to learn how to become right about a market, rather than simply teaching it a collection of historically correct answers.

We describe this informally as learning to learn.

02 — Synthetic worlds

Training on worlds where we know what the model does not know

A major part of P34 training takes place on synthetic and augmented datasets. Synthetic data is useful here for a reason that goes beyond producing more training samples.

In a real business, we usually cannot observe the counterfactual truth. If a business rejected an order for 40 units, we normally do not know with certainty what its realized profit would have been had it accepted that order.

In a synthetic environment, we can. We can generate the complete underlying market and then deliberately hide most of it from the model.

The training process can therefore reproduce the information structure of a real business:

  • the market contains a large menu of possible actions;
  • the historical business chooses only some of them;
  • outcomes are visible primarily for those selected actions;
  • smaller quantities may sometimes be safely grounded from executed quantities;
  • market conditions change;
  • business selection policies change;
  • profitable and unprofitable opportunities overlap in observable feature space;
  • downside regimes can appear;
  • and future menus contain opportunities that the historical policy never selected.

The model receives the biased view. The training system retains the full or augmented truth needed to determine how good the model's reasoning actually was.

That distinction is fundamental.

What we are not merely asking

Did the model fit the training labels?

What we can ask instead

Given incomplete and biased evidence, did the model construct the interpretation of the market that led to the right future decisions?

That gives us a training signal about the quality of the learning process itself.

03 — Supervision

From prediction labels to labels about predictions

This changes what a training example means.

At the lowest level, P34 can still learn ordinary relationships between telemetry and economic outcomes. A deal has characteristics; some outcome such as profit is eventually observed; the model can learn from that relationship.

But P34 adds higher levels of supervision. The model can make a prediction or construct a candidate portfolio. We can then expose what actually happened in a withheld future period or synthetic continuation.

Was the model right about its own prediction?

And there are several ways to define "right."

  • Did the selected portfolio generate the profit the model expected?
  • Did supposedly profitable trades actually become false positives?
  • Did a proposed interpretation remain calibrated in a different market regime?
  • Did the model correctly decide to avoid a market?
  • Did it choose the right quantity?
  • Did the portfolio remain economically useful when the historical business policy was no longer filtering opportunities for it?

Training can therefore operate on more than the original economic labels. It can use holdouts, forward windows, out-of-fold predictions, portfolio calibration, false-positive outcomes, and other augmented signals describing how the learner behaved.

The object being learned gradually moves from:

features → profit

toward something closer to:

market evidence → interpretation → prediction → observed correctness → improved interpretation

This is the sense in which P34 is being trained to learn to learn.

04 — The failure mode

Why ordinary training can produce the wrong confidence

Consider a business that historically attempted only opportunities its operators believed were attractive. Suppose an ordinary model is trained on that history.

It may learn an excellent function for distinguishing the better deals inside the already-filtered dataset. Its validation AUC may look excellent. Its error metrics may look excellent. A backtest conducted on another subset of historically accepted deals may even look profitable.

But deployment changes the problem. The model is now being asked to inspect a much larger menu, including opportunities that the old business policy would never have accepted. It begins extrapolating.

Some of those rejected regions can look extremely attractive according to the patterns learned from the accepted region.

The model becomes confidently wrong precisely where the business lacks historical evidence.

Our synthetic training environments intentionally reproduce this condition. A model is not rewarded merely for producing attractive-looking predictions on familiar data. We can evaluate what happens when its learned reasoning is allowed to operate over the complete deployment menu.

This is one of the key reasons P34 training emphasizes false-positive behavior rather than conventional prediction accuracy alone.

05 — Competing universes

Multiple interpretations instead of one memorized answer

P34's architecture is intentionally structured to resist the assumption that the historical dataset describes one complete, observable truth. It can instead construct multiple plausible interpretations — or universes — of the partially observed market.

Different universes can represent different explanations for:

  • missing opportunities;
  • historical selection bias;
  • market regimes;
  • false-positive risk;
  • changing margins;
  • hidden demand;
  • and future drift.

Those interpretations can then compete. The training problem becomes partly a problem of learning:

Given what happened when similar interpretations were used elsewhere, which interpretation should we trust now?

That is deliberately different from fitting one large predictor to one historical table.

The higher-level selector works with generalized telemetry about model behavior — regime information, prediction quality, calibration behavior, false-positive correction, portfolio characteristics and related signals — rather than depending entirely on the identity of a particular product or market.

The architectural objective is important: information about how to learn successfully should be more reusable than information about one particular training market.

06 — Market alignment

We do not want a universal model that fears everything

There is an opposite failure mode. If a model is trained against every imaginable disaster, distribution shift and black swan, the easiest strategy is often extreme conservatism. Do nothing. Take almost no risk. Assume every unfamiliar opportunity is dangerous.

Such a system can look robust while being economically useless.

Our goal is not to build an omniscient model that must work in every conceivable market. Instead, part of the P34 development process is market alignment.

We identify families of markets in which the P34 abstraction appears applicable: markets with structured opportunity menus, measurable economic outcomes, repeated decisions, partial observation, and sufficient telemetry to evaluate the resulting policy. We then deliberately train and evaluate the model across variations of those market structures.

This is dedicated engineering work. We would rather build a model with a defensible competence region than create an "expert of everything" that is actually an expert of nothing.

A wholesale inventory market, for example, can be varied across demand volatility, margin compression, inventory writeoff, quantity sensitivity, business-selection behavior and market regimes while preserving the underlying structure of the decision problem. Training across these variations teaches invariants of that market class rather than memorizing one historical trajectory.

Additional market classes can be incorporated as evidence accumulates that the same decision architecture applies — which is what the catalogue tracks, market by market.

07 — Capability vs. preference

Capability alignment and risk preference are different things

We also distinguish learning a market from choosing how aggressively to operate in it. Those are separate questions.

First, we want the model to correctly understand the economic decision problem:

  • which opportunities are likely to make money;
  • which are likely false positives;
  • how quantity changes expected outcomes;
  • when the market is different from its historical context;
  • and when declining to trade is the best action.

Then we can define preferences over economically valid strategies. For example, two users might use the same underlying model but have different preferences for:

  • available capital;
  • acceptable maximum drawdown;
  • portfolio concentration;
  • number of losing trades;
  • downside variance;
  • turnover;
  • or the tradeoff between total profit and consistency.

A strategy generating $1 million while suffering a $900,000 drawdown is not equivalent to a strategy generating $800,000 with a $100,000 drawdown. Similarly, two strategies with the same total profit can behave very differently if one earns it through hundreds of highly volatile losses and gains while another produces much more stable portfolios.

Our alignment process therefore looks not only at how much total profit was produced, but also at characteristics such as how many trades lost, how losses were distributed, and what capital was required to survive the strategy. These signals let us align the model's portfolio policy to practical capital and risk constraints.

But those preferences should not be confused with market competence. Maximum drawdown is a preference. Capital availability is a constraint. Risk tolerance is a preference.

Knowing how to reason about the market in the first place is a learned capability.

We treat the latter as dedicated model-training work.

08 — The training target

Profit is the objective, but profit alone is not enough

PARML stands for Profit-As-Regression Machine Learning because P34 ultimately connects its decisions to final economic outcomes. That does not mean the training system blindly maximizes historical profit.

Historical profit by itself can be a terrible training target. A lucky strategy can make money. A strategy with hidden catastrophic tail risk can make money during the training period. A model can overfit one synthetic generator. A portfolio can maximize theoretical return while requiring more capital than the operator possesses.

Instead, profit provides the economic anchor around which a richer training signal is constructed. We can evaluate:

  • realized versus predicted profit;
  • false-positive trades;
  • positive and negative portfolio outcomes;
  • number and severity of losing trades;
  • capital usage;
  • drawdown;
  • calibration;
  • performance under changed regimes;
  • and performance on previously unseen market instances.

In other words, we train the system not merely to maximize the answer it saw during training, but to discover decision procedures whose predictions continue to be economically correct when the underlying environment changes.

09 — Architecture

Architecture as an anti-overfitting mechanism

The current iteration of P34 includes explicit architectural choices intended to encourage this behavior. The system separates several levels of reasoning rather than collapsing the entire task into one predictor.

LevelWhat happens there
TelemetryRaw business telemetry feeds representations of market and business regimes.
Regime representationsThose representations inform profit and false-positive models.
Candidate expansionCandidate predictions are expanded into alternative portfolio interpretations.
Competing universesMultiple plausible universes compete.
Behavioral telemetryHigher-level telemetry describes how those universes behave.
SelectorA selector learns which interpretation is more likely to remain correct.
PortfolioThe selected interpretation generates an executable portfolio.

This hierarchy creates places where generalization can be tested independently.

  • Was the underlying label estimate wrong?
  • Was the regime interpreted incorrectly?
  • Was a false positive missed?
  • Was the wrong universe selected?
  • Was the quantity boundary wrong?
  • Was a portfolio economically correct but inconsistent with the chosen capital policy?

Those are different errors, and treating them as different learning surfaces makes it harder for the system to hide all of its reasoning inside one highly fitted function. The architecture is therefore deliberately biased toward reusable learning behavior rather than memorization of one dataset.

It does not make overfitting impossible. No architecture can guarantee that. Instead, it lets us construct training and evaluation loops in which overfitting becomes observable — and in which generalized decision behavior can itself become a training target.

10 — Curriculum

Synthetic data is a curriculum, not a substitute for reality

This is also why we do not view synthetic data as a replacement for real markets. Synthetic markets have a different role: they allow us to create controlled lessons.

  • A market where historical selection bias is known.
  • Then one where margins slowly disappear.
  • Then one where the business changes its acceptance policy.
  • Then one where demand becomes volatile.
  • Then one where a previously useful signal stops working.
  • Then one where additional risk is justified.
  • Then one where doing nothing is the correct policy.

Because the underlying world is known, we can determine precisely where the learner succeeded and where it fooled itself.

Augmented real-market data, forward tests, shadow deployments and eventually realized live outcomes then provide another layer of evidence. The objective is a training loop in which synthetic environments provide controlled experiments while real and augmented environments continuously test whether the learned behavior survives contact with actual markets.

11 — Where this goes

The model is learning a decision process

There is a useful distinction between a model that has learned many markets and a model that has learned how to learn a market.

The first model may contain an enormous amount of historical knowledge. The second needs to answer a more useful sequence of questions:

  • What evidence is available here?
  • How was that evidence selected?
  • What is missing?
  • Which interpretation of the missing data is plausible?
  • Which of my predictions should I distrust?
  • What changed relative to the environments where this reasoning worked?
  • What portfolio follows from this interpretation?
  • And given the operator's capital and risk preferences, should I trade at all?

That is the direction of P34 training.

We do not consider it solved. The current model has a limited regime library, synthetic evidence does not prove live-market performance, and the boundaries of cross-market generalization remain an active research question.

But the architectural objective is clear. P34 is not being trained merely to predict profit.

It is being trained to repeatedly discover how to become right about profit from incomplete evidence — and then to translate that learned understanding into an economically aligned decision.

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Research note — 14 September 2026. Training methodology; synthetic evidence is labeled as synthetic and does not establish live-market performance.